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The Constitutional Value of Dialogue
and the New Judicial Federalism
BY LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN*

Introduction
The story of the modem state constitutionalism movement
begins with a 1977 Harvard Law Review article by United States
Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. In that short essay,
Justice Brennan canvassed the federalization of constitutional law
through

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution and concluded that this doctrinal evolution had altered
the work of state courts, a development "both necessary and
desirable under our federal system."' Significantly, Brennan also
urged state courts not to regard the Fourteenth Amendment as an
analytical endpoint in cases involving individual rights and liberties;
rather, he advised that state constitutions, too, should be viewed as a
source of rights and liberties whose protection may extend "beyond
those2 required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law."
Justice Brennan's appeal to state courts to protect individual

rights and liberties under state constitutions has suffered criticism for

* Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School; Attorney, Choate, Hall & Stewart,
Boston, Massachusetts. For her guidance and counsel, I thank Carol Steiker. For their
comments and suggestions, I thank my colleagues Seth Aframe, Kathleen Burdette, Carlos
Perez-Albuerne, and especially Joan Wasser. I also thank Charles Fried for his thoughts,
and for his candid disagreement with my argument. And for her patience, I thank my
assistant, Jennifer Miller. All errors remain my own.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489,491 (1977).
2. Id. Justice Brennan notably did not limit his state constitutional advocacy to the
pages of law reviews. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (observing that "[e]ach state has power to impose higher standards
governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution").
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its programmatic, result-oriented cast.3
Notwithstanding such4
criticism, state supreme courts have answered Justice Brennan's call,
embracing the "new judicial federalism" as a vehicle for

independently interpreting state constitutional provisions protecting
individual rights and liberties that parallel provisions of the Bill of
Rights
To this end, state courts have employed one of three
3. This criticism reflects a belief that Brennan advanced the cause of state
constitutionalism from fear that the United States Supreme Court would retrench its
individual rights jurisprudence following the succession of Chief Justice Warren Burger to
the Court.

See Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution

Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (1996) (referring to Brennan's "outcomebased motivation"); Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamism of the "New Judicial
Federalism," 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233, 235 (1989) (observing that "the

revival of interest in state constitutionalism is generally conceded to be a reaction to the
Burger Court's perceived hostility to Warren Court activism and its extension"); Earl M.
Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State ConstitutionalLaw, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 432 (1988) (criticizing Brennan's "message" that "state courts

should vindicate personal liberties along the lines undertaken by the Warren Court"). But
see Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New Jersey Supreme Court, and State
Constitutions: The Evolution of a State ConstitutionalConsciousness,29 RUTGERS LJ.763

(1998) (arguing that Brennan's attention to state constitutions was not simply a resultsoriented reaction to the Burger and Rehnquist courts).
4. See James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy
of Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1509 (1998)

(observing that since Brennan's essay appeared, "[s]tate courts have now rendered
hundreds of decisions which grant greater protection to individual rights.., than the
Supreme Court has been willing to afford under the Federal Constitution"); John D.
Boutwell, The Cause of Action for Damages UnderNorth Carolina'sConstitution: Corum

v. University of North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1899, 1910 n.70 (1992) (noting that
Brennan "is primarily responsible for this revamping of federalism"); Stewart G. Pollock,
State Constitutionsas Separate Sources of FundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707,

716 (1983) (declaring Justice Brennan's HarvardLaw Review article the "Magna Carta of
state constitutional law"). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 535, 549 (1986) (observing that "state courts have responded with marvelous
enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by the
decisions of the Supreme Court majority"). As Justice Randall T. Shepard has rightly
noted, see Shepard, supra note 3, at 422, Oregon's Justice Hans Linde also contributed
significantly to the development of the new judicial federalism. See, e.g., Hans Linde, First
Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980)
[hereinafter, FirstThings First];Hans Linde, Without "Due Process" UnconstitutionalLaw

in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970).
5. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 624 (NJ. 1980) (asserting that "state
constitutions exist as a cognate source of individual freedoms and ... state constitutional
guarantees of these rights may indeed surpass the guarantees of the federal
Constitution"). Note that the term "new judicial federalism" specifically refers to
"decisions by state high courts based on provisions of state constitutions that have served
either as independent and adequate bases, or as the only bases, for ruling on questions of
individual rights and liberties." John Kincaid, Foreword.The New FederalismContext of

the New JudicialFederalism,26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 913 n.1 (1995). As Robert F. Williams
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interpretive methodologies in construing cognate provisions: the
"lockstep" approach, by which the court tracks the U.S. Supreme
Court's prior interpretation of the federal constitutional text; the
"criteria" approach, by which the state court determines whether one
or more factors unique to the state constitution militates in favor of a
departure from the federal interpretation; and the "primacy"
approach, by which the state court undertakes an independent
constitutional analysis, using all the tools appropriate to the task, and
relying upon federal decisional law only for guidance.
In cases in which a state supreme court employs the primacy
approach, the court may well interpret its state constitutional
provisions protecting individual rights and liberties more expansively
than the U.S. Supreme Court in the same circumstances. 7 Indeed,
state courts employing the primacy approach typically assume that
they validly may regard the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning on, say,
the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to automobile
searches, as having no determinative weight in the interpretation of
the parallel state constitutional protection.8
Such rulings,
unsurprisingly, have attracted the attention of commentators and

and others have observed, the "new" judicial federalism is no longer so new. See Robert
F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: ContinuingMethodology and Legitimacy
Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1015, 1017 (1997); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword." The Once "New Judicial
Federalism" & Its Critics,64 WASH. L. REv. 5 (1989). Nonetheless, for purposes of this
paper I refer to the movement as "new judicial federalism," because that is the term by
which it is commonly known, and because the term signifies that the movement is in
significant ways a discrete aspect of the practice of law before state courts. Further, I shall
continue to refer to the specific subject of new judicial federalism as the interpretation of
"parallel" or "cognate" provisions of the state and federal constitutions, though at least
one commentator has suggested that the term "potentially applicable state constitutional
provisions" is preferable because "parallel" implies a "subordinate status for the state
constitution." Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State Courts in Adapting State Law to
Changed Federal Interpretations, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.5 (1994). To the
contrary, I believe that "parallel" and "cognate" imply, correctly, a sense of structural
equality as between a state constitutional provision and its federal counterpart.
6. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 180-85 (1998)
(discussing methodological approaches to state constitutional interpretation); Williams,
supra note 5, at 1018-19.
7. See, e.g, New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994) (holding that
state constitutional equivalent of the First Amendment requires that private shopping
center allow non-commercial leafletting, subject to reasonable regulation);
Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981) (holding that state constitutional right
of speech applies to private property used as forum for public debate).
8. See, e.g., State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 411 (N.H. 1995) (finding unconvincing
the United States Supreme Court's justifications for an "automobile exception" to the
warrant requirement under part I, article 19 of the state constitution).
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jurists who maintain that independent state court interpretations of
textual provisions previously addressed by the Supreme Court lack
legitimacy.9
The legitimacy issue in the context of cognate constitutional
provisions, as G. Alan Tarr has explained, "is whether a presumption
of validity should be given to the nonauthoritative constitutional
judgment of a prior interpreter and, if so, how strong that
presumption should be."10 In essence, critics argue that expansive
state constitutional interpretation of cognate provisions may reflect
nothing more than disagreement with the Supreme Court's reasoning
or adoption of Justice Brennan's programmatic aims, and amounts to
simple result-oriented rejection of the U.S. Supreme Court's
narrower interpretations of federal constitutional provisions
protecting individual rights and liberties." At bottom, of course,
9. In this context, "legitimacy" refers "to the debated propriety of state courts
reaching results under their constitutions which are contrary to prior Supreme Court
decisions rendered under similar or identical federal constitutional provisions." Robert F.
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court
Reasoningand Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 355 n.3 (1984). Such state court rulings should
be distinguished from those cases that concern state constitutional provisions that have no
federal counterpart. See, e.g., Claremont School District v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375
(N.H. 1993) (holding that state constitution's "education" clause imposes duty on state to
provide adequate education to all educable children). See generallyAllen W. Hubsch, The
Emerging Right to Education Under State ConstitutionalLaw, 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 1325,
1343-48 (1992) (surveying state constitutional education clauses). State supreme courts
have unquestioned authority to interpret unique provisions of their own constitutions,
though these rulings, too, may attract criticism, albeit of a different character. See TARR,
supra note 6, at 176 n.10; Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow, supra,at 355.
10. TARR, supra note 6, at 175; See also Williams, supra note 5, at 1055 (primary
legitimacy concern in state constitutional law involves "the relation between state courts
and the U.S. Supreme Court: when can a state court interpret its state guarantees to reach
a result different from that obtained by the Supreme Court interpreting the Federal
Constitution?").
11. See, e.g., People v. Scott & People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1350-51 (N.Y. 1992)
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for acting upon "ideological
disagreement... with the definitive decisions of the highest Court in the land"); State v.
Jewett, 500 A.2d 233,235 (Vt. 1985) (warning that "[i]t would be a serious mistake for this
Court to use its state constitution chiefly to evade the impact of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court"); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) (expressing
misgivings about the assumption "that state constitutional law is simply 'available' to be
manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory");
George Deukmejian & Clifford Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review
Under the California Constitution,6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 975, 1009 (1979) (criticizing
California Supreme Court for being "result-oriented"). See also TARR, supra note 6, at
176 (suggesting that when interpretations diverge, "it may be that one of the interpreters
has interpreted the pertinent constitutional provision wrongly by mistake or by design in
order to promote the interpreter's own value preferences").
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these critics likely would reject primacy itself as a legitimate
methodological approach to constitutional interpretation. 2
Contrary to this view, I argue in this paper that independent state
court interpretation of cognate state constitutional provisions using
the primacy approach is institutionally legitimate and, indeed,
normatively desirable within the framework of federalism-desirable
because, like the system of constitutional checks and balances in the
context of horizontal federalism, independent state constitutionalism
may serve to balance the actions of another institutional entity: the
U.S. Supreme Court.13 I contend, moreover, that, insofar as the new
judicial federalism reflects attempts by state courts independently to
interpret the meaning of cognate textual provisions, its legitimacy is
buoyed by the federal constitutional value of dialogue - that is, the
value that attaches to discourse about law and governance that occurs
between and among the different organs of the federal and state
governments.
In other words, though a state court's authority to interpret its
own constitution flows most immediately from that constitution, the
legitimacy of its independent interpretation of a cognate provision
derives support from a value enshrined in the federal constitution. A
fuller understanding of this value suggests that state courts should
eschew the lockstep and criteria approaches to the interpretation of
cognate provisions. For in acknowledging the value of dialogue, a
state court not only honors the authority of its institutional role
within the federal scheme, it also engages the U.S. Supreme Court in
discourse about the interpretive possibilities inherent in constitutional
provisions that "do not establish and divide fields of black and
white."' 4 Given the Supreme Court's relatively isolated institutional
12. See State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1112 (N.H. 1995) (Thayer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing analysis that did not rely upon federal precedent, and accusing majority of
"invent[ing] new constitutional protections"); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 963 (N.J. 1982)
(Handler, J., concurring) (warning of the danger in court in turning uncritically to state
constitution "for convenient solutions to problems not readily or obviously found
elsewhere"). Cf Guiney v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523,527-28 (Mass.
1991) (Nolan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's deviation from U.S. Supreme Court
precedent absent a "compelling reason" to do so).
13. See Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground,68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1107, 113437 (2000) (discussing the inter-branch checking and balancing functions of horizontal
federalism).
14. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., concurring)
(describing the "great ordinances of the Constitution," and noting that "[e]ven the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other"). As Joseph R. Grodin has stated, "neither logic nor history
requires that [state courts] accord state constitutional language the same meaning as the
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position, 15 such engagement can inform interpretive debates among
judges, scholars, and citizens about the meaning of constitutional text,
and thereby balance the interpretational judgment of the Supreme
Court.
To be clear, my concern in this paper is not to advocate for, or to
justify, the outcomes reached by state courts in particular cases.
Rather, I seek to enrich the story of modern state constitutionalism
by suggesting that state high courts can, and should, take seriously the
project of constitutionalism, broadly conceived, by embracing the
constitutional value of dialogue. In this regard, I aim to provide
theoretical support for the view that, regardless of the outcome, state
courts should engage the U.S. Supreme Court on its own terms in
respect to issues of constitutional interpretation.
This paper thus compliments the work of such scholars as
Jennifer Friesen, who has rightly noted that arguments in support of a
truly independent set of constitutional rules at the state level should
"not necessarily [respond] to the call of any ideological agenda,
whether of the left or the right," for "no test for judicial review of
constitutional rights, whether of the balancing, multi-factor, or
categorical variety, should be embraced without first testing it against
criteria of good governance."' 6 Friesen maintains that a state court's
primary obligation vis-4-vis the state constitution should not be to
create a jurisprudence that reflects the state's unique constitutional
heritage, but "to make good constitutional law."'17 To this end, state
courts should strive "to produce, to the extent possible within
institutional constraints, intelligible rules of conduct for future use as
well as proper results in the immediate case."' 8 An appreciation for
the constitutional value of dialogue can further this end by supporting
United States Supreme Court has accorded a comparable provision of the federal
Constitution." Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on State Constitutions,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 400 (1988). See also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We
Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 731

(1991) (suggesting that differences in the interpretation of state and federal constitutions
reflect the "difficulties of interpreting language").
15. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (discussing U.S.
Supreme Court's "primary authority" to interpret the federal constitution).
16. Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTR DAME L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1997). See also Heiple &
Powell, supra note 4, at 1510 (noting that "[a] state court can interpret its constitution to
protect the economic and property rights traditionally favored by conservatives as easily as
it can protect the civil rights and liberties customarily championed by liberals").
17. Friesen, supra note 16, at 1071.
18. Id.
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state court efforts to refine and, potentially, improve upon federal
constitutional doctrine.
This paper also compliments the work of Professor Paul Kahn.
In his seminal essay on state constitutional law, Interpretation and
Authority in State Constitutionalism,9 Kahn suggested that
constitutionalism is not a single set of truths, but an ongoing
debate about the meaning of the rule of law in a democratic
political order. At both the state and national levels, this
debate focuses upon the ideas of liberty, equality, and due
process, as well as upon the structures of representative
government necessary to realize these values. °
In Kahn's view, state constitutionalism should be appreciated as a
means to enhance national understanding of the most important
aspects of American democracy. I am sympathetic to this goal, and
seek in this paper to sketch the foundational basis for state courts to
approach state constitutional interpretation as an ' 21
aspect of the
"ongoing debate about the meaning of the rule of law.
I proceed by reviewing in Part I the three dominant
methodologies employed in state constitutional interpretation and the
current criticism in the courts and in the academy of state
constitutional interpretation advanced pursuant to the criteria and
primacy approaches. In Part II, I turn to a discussion of the
architecture, purposes, and goals of "dialogue" between persons and
between entities. This part explores the significance of dialogue, so
understood, as a tacit expectation of a federal constitutional scheme
that serves as an important check on the potential excesses of
branches and organs of the state and federal governments. In Part
III, Iargue that the constitutional value of dialogue adds legitimacy to
independent state constitutional interpretation of correlative state
and federal individual provisions, to the extent that the state court
engages the U.S. Supreme Court by either challenging or confirming
the Supreme Court's reasoning. Given the potential benefits of such
engagement, I contend that, as a normative matter, state courts
should favor the primacy approach to state constitutional
interpretation.
The paper moves from these points to a discussion in Part IV of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in a case involving the
validity of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as a
19. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism,106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147 (1993).
20. Id. at 1147-48.
21. Id. at 1148.
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and the constitutional

dialogue with the United States Supreme Court that ensued regarding
the relative scope of the state and federal constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. I suggest that this case
begins to realize the constitutional expectation of dialogue, and to
highlight the salutary effects of such dialogue. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the continued importance of constitutional
dialogue between state and federal courts to the functioning of the
federal system and the larger project of American constitutionalism.
I. Authority, Legitimacy and Methods of State Constitutional
Interpretation
We begin with an unexceptional point: state supreme courts have
the unquestioned, final authority to interpret their state constitutions.
This authority finds its source in a federal constitutional structure that
divides sovereignty between the state and federal governments. 3 This
system presumes state governments to be supreme within their
realms, and the federal government to be supreme within its realm.24
Regardless, then, of the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements
concerning the breadth and scope of the federal constitution, the
highest court of each state remains the final arbiter of the meaning of
state law including the state constitution. Indeed, "in a situation
where a state supreme court interprets a state constitutional provision
even one textually indistinguishable from the federal provision the [U.S.] Supreme Court, far from being final, has nothing at all to
say." As Oregon Court of Appeals Judge Rex Armstrong succinctly
explained:
When I became a judge on the Oregon Court of Appeals, I took
an oath to support the Oregon Constitution. That means, in a
case before our court involving a challenge to the validity of a
state statute under the Oregon Constitution, I am obliged to
22. 653 A.2d at 1097.

23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 262 (James Madison) (stating that -[t]he federal
and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes").
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 213 (James Madison) (arguing that under the
U.S. Constitution, states retain "residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all... objects"
not within the power of the federal government).
25. Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK L. REv. 681,

710-11 (1997). See also Friesen, supra note 16, at 1073 (discussing power of state supreme
courts "to interpret state law, including constitutional law, in any way they deem sound");
Williams, supra note 9, at 381 ("A state court decision interpreting the state constitution is
insulated from vertical, federal judicial review.").
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uphold the constitution. To do that, I have to decide what the
constitution means. That is the task assigned to me as a state
judge."

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the
task of interpreting state constitutions lies within the province of the
state courts. In 1980, the Court observed, in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins,' that each state has a "sovereign right to adopt in its

own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
The Court refined this
conferred by the Federal Constitution."
understanding in a 1983 case, Michigan v. Long." In Michigan v.
Long, the Court instructed state supreme courts on how properly to
insulate their state law decisions from federal court scrutiny, holding
that it would not review a state court decision, even when that
decision refers to federal law, so long as the state court opinion
"indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona
fide, separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds."'
Michigan v. Long thus confirms that a state court has the authority
under its constitution to interpret state law and, when the state court
explicitly bases its determination upon an interpretation of the state
constitution, the federal courts may not revisit that determination.
But the fact that a state court has final authority vis-h-vis the

federal courts to interpret the state constitution does not necessarily
resolve the legitimacy issues that constitutional litigation naturally
implicates.'
Indeed, notwithstanding a state court's authority to
26. Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 493, 495 (1996)
(footnote omitted).
27. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
28. Id. at 81. See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (noting that
"[i]ndividual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution").
29. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
30. Id. at 1041.
31. State constitutional interpretation, for example, inevitably raises a traditional
counter-majoritarian concern - namely, the fear that judges will read the state constitution
without reference to any interpretive aid other than their own political and personal
predilections. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 45-46 (1997) (criticizing the notion of an interpretive theory based
upon a "living" constitution, which would allow each Supreme Court justice to decide for
him - or herself what the federal constitution means); Neals-Erik William Delker, The
House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers'Intent, and the Judiciary'sRole,
100 DICK. L. REV. 341, 344 (1996) (arguing that we must restrict judges from reading
"their own notions of the propriety of ...legislative act[s]" into the federal constitution);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.L. REV. 1,
15 (1959) (arguing that the judicial process "must be genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
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interpret its state's constitution, legitimacy questions will continue to
arise in connection with the interpretation of constitutional provisions
whose federal cognate the U.S. Supreme Court has already
interpreted - that is, when the meaning of a textual provision has
already been addressed by a court competent to make such
determinations. Thus,
[j]ust as advocates of judicial restraint at the national level have
argued that judges should defer to the judgments of the
people's representatives, so their counterparts at the state level
have insisted that state judges should defer to the
interpretations . . . that the Supreme Court32 has given to

analogous provisions of the federal constitution.
The problem has been stated more pointedly by Charles Fried,
writing as a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:
"[w]hen a state supreme court reasons that the same or similar words
constrain the democratic processes.., more tightly than the Supreme
a question to
Court has
33 found, there is at least a tension and
answer."
In the more than twenty years since Brennan's call to action in
the pages of the Harvard Law Review, state courts have generally
sought to address these legitimacy concerns ex ante, as a
constitutional matter and as a normative matter, by employing one of
three methodological
approaches
to state constitutional
interpretation: the lockstep approach, the criteria approach, and the
primacy approach. I review each approach in turn.
A. The Lockstep Approach

Under the lockstep approach, the state constitutional analysis
begins and ends with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the textual provision at issue. On this approach,
federal rulings are regarded as having attained "a presumption of
correctness" from which the state court should be loathe to part.' In
transcending the immediate result that is achieved"). But see Robert A. Schapiro, Identity
and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 428-30 (1998) (arguing
that judicial review "under state constitutions appears more firmly grounded in the
democratic processes of the state").
32. TARR, supra note 6, at 175.
33. Fried, supra note 25, at 711. See also Developments in the Law - The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1357 (1982)
[hereinafter Developments] (contending that, "[w]hen a state court diverges from the
federal view, a reasoned explanation of the divergence may be necessary if the decision is
to command respect").
34. Williams, supra note 9, at 356. See also Charles G. Douglas, III, The Unique Role
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other words, congruence with federal decisional law is assumed to be
the norm, and deviation is for all intents and purposes impossible.'
Such an approach is justified, at least in regard to the enforcement of
the criminal law, by an interest in uniformity, which urges the
development of identical state and federal rules to control
government conduct in regard to procedural issues. 6
To illustrate, consider State v. Jackson,' a 1983 decision of the
Supreme Court of Montana.
Jackson concerned the question
whether the trial court properly found that under the state and
federal guarantees against self-incrimination the defendant's refusal
to submit to a Breathalyzer sobriety test should be suppressed. The
Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the trial court, but the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Montana
court "to consider whether its judgment [was] based upon federal or
state constitutional grounds ... ."' The Supreme Court of Montana
concluded that, in its original opinion, it had inappropriately ignored
its prior rulings, which held
the Montana constitutional guarantee of the privilege against
self-incrimination affords no broader protection to an accused
than does the Fifth Amendment and that the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court delineates the maximum breadth
of the privilege against self-incrimination in Montana.3 9
And so the court fixed the meaning of Montana's constitutional
parallel to the Fifth Amendment at the same point at which the
United States Supreme Court fixed the Fifth Amendment itself. As
Professor Tarr has accurately noted, this is "one way to banish
legitimacy concerns. '

of State Constitutions:Raising State Issues in New Hampshire,28 N.H. BAR J. 309, 316-17

(1987) (discussing "lockstep" approach as the "judicial clone approach").
35. See Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of
Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 635, 638 (1994).

36. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (NJ. 1982) (observing that "[d]ivergent
interpretations [may be] unsatisfactory from the public perspective, particularly where the
historical roots and purposes of the federal and state provisions are the same").
37. 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
38. Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
40. TARR, supra note 6, at 180. In Florida such constitutional congruence has been
imposed through a 1982 constitutional amendment requiring that the state cognate of the
Fourth Amendment "be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST,
art. 1, § 12.
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B. The Criteria Approach

A second approach to state constitutional interpretation utilizes
a set of interpretive criteria for determining whether deviation from
U.S. Supreme Court precedent is warranted in a particular case. This
approach advises that state courts assume "the dominance of federal
law and focus directly on the gap-filling potential of state
constitutions."'" Accordingly, in a given case the state court should
look first to the federal constitution, and only if federal law provides
no relief turn to the state constitution to determine whether a specific
criterion - for example, unique state history or state experience justifies departure from federal precedent.'
In his concurring opinion in State v. Hunt,43 New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice Alan Handler endorsed the criteria approach and
endeavored to develop a list of factors to steer the state court's
determination whether to deviate from U.S. Supreme Court
precedent in a given case.' Hunt concerned the question of whether
individuals had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in
personal telephone records, an interest that the U.S. Supreme Court
had concluded in Smith v. Maryland5 was not protected under the
federal constitution." The New Jersey court, interpreting the state
constitution, reached the contrary conclusion. The majority did not
elaborate the basis upon which it declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning in addressing the state constitutional issue; in
response, Justice Handler noted that, while "there is no mandate that
a state court explain itself when it invokes the state charter to achieve
a result unavailable under federal law,"'47 the court should rely upon
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court as "important guides on the
subjects which they squarely address. '
Thus implicitly acknowledging that the state court should first
review the protections available under the federal constitution in a
given case, Justice Handler enumerated the criteria to be considered
in determining whether the state constitution provides more
expansive protection. These criteria include: (1) textual language 41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Developments, supranote 33, at 1357.
TARR, supra note 6, at 182.
450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
See id. at 965-67.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 745.
Hunt, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handier, J., concurring).
Id.
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whether the phrasing of the state constitutional provision significantly
differs from its federal counterpart; (2) legislative history of the state
constitutional provision; (3) preexisting state law, which may suggest
"distinctive state constitutional rights;" (4) state traditions, which may
emphasize greater protections for individual rights; and (5) public
attitudes, which may inform the state constitutional inquiry.49 Justice
Handler reasoned that "[t]he explication of standards such as these
demonstrates that the discovery of unique individual rights in a state
constitution does not spring from pure intuition but, rather, from a
process that is reasonable and reasoned."5
Other state courts have adopted similar criteria to govern the
process of state constitutional interpretation of cognate provisions.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has looked to whether
there is some reason to depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent
by reference to a variety of factors, similar to those enumerated by
Justice Handler, including text and history of the state constitutional
provision."' And in Washington, the state supreme court has used like
factors as interpretive benchmarks, "to the end that [the court's]
decision will be made for well founded legal reasons and not by
merely substituting [the court's] notion of justice for that of duly
elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court." 2
Note, however, that the criteria need not be uniform from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction; in Illinois, for example, the Supreme Court will
construe similar constitutional provisions differently only when "the
language of the State constitution, or where debates and committee
reports of the constitutional convention show that the Framers
intended a different construction....

49. Id.at 965-67.
50. Id. at 967. Applying these standards to the case at hand, Justice Handler
concluded that the New Jersey Constitution did provide greater privacy rights in regard to
telephonic communication:
The protection we now accord telephone billing records follows the course long
set under New Jersey law .... [O]ur State has been a strong proponent in the
area of protecting telephonic communications. We have safeguarded the privacy
of such communications to the broadest extent possible. Consistent with this
longstanding statutory and legal tradition of extending the utmost solicitude to
telephonic communications, I am satisfied that the New Jersey Constitution
protects the privacy of all aspects of telephone use, including toll billing records.

Id. at 969.
51. See State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315,1324 (Conn. 1993).
52. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986).
53. People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336,342 (Ill.
1992).
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C. The Primacy Approach
The primacy approach entails at least two commitments on the
part of the state court: first, to begin its constitutional analysis with
the text of the state constitution and second, to rely upon federal
decisional law only for guidance in illuminating the issues presented
by analysis of the state constitutional text. Hans Linde, formerly of
the Oregon Supreme Court and an originator of the primacy
approach, suggests that principles of judicial restraint mandate the
first commitment: the state appellate court should begin its analysis in
a criminal case with the state constitution, when the issue has been
raised, because there is no deprivation of a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights when the relief she seeks may be found in the
state constitution.' Only if relief is not found in the state charter
should the court then examine [the] conviction from a standpoint of
federal constitutional law.5 The primacy approach thus alleviates
legitimacy concerns by making "[r]ecurrence to state law ... an
obligation, not a choice."5
A commitment to the primacy approach also requires the state
court to regard the state constitution as the U.S. Supreme Court
regards the federal constitution - that is, as a text with a particular
and significant meaning for the state's citizens.'
The second
commitment to the primacy approach accordingly mandates that state
courts employ the familiar tools of constitutional interpretation in
determining the meaning of a state constitutional provision in light of
the facts of the case; those tools include reference to textual language,
constitutional structure, original intent, the history of the provision at
issue, and previous interpretations of similar textual provisions by
54. See Linde, supra note 4, at 383; John W. Shaw, PrincipledInterpretationsof State
ConstitutionalLaw - Why Don't the "Primacy"States PracticeWhat They Preach?, 54 U.
PITr. L. REV. 1019, 1025-26 (1993). See also Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981)
("The proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before
reaching a federal constitutional claim."). As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has
stated:
Just as it is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure to avoid expressing
opinions on constitutional questions when some other resolution of the issues
renders a constitutional ruling unnecessary, a similar policy of judicial restraint
moves us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional issues before consulting
our state constitution.
State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984) (citation omitted).
55. See Linde, supra note 4, at 383.
56. TARR, supra note 6, at 184.
57. See James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of State Constitutionalism.90 MICH.
L. REv. 761,774 (1992).
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other courts." On this approach, then, any congruence between state

and federal standards in a given case reflects, at best, coincidence."
In practice, few state supreme courts routinely undertake a state

constitutional analysis prior to a federal constitutional analysis, or
rely upon federal precedent only for guidance.' Concurring in State
v. Hunt, discussed above,6' New Jersey Supreme Court Justice

Pashman urged his colleagues to adopt this approach, arguing that,
"[a]s a general rule, this Court should construe the New Jersey

Constitution as it considers appropriate, taking into account the
various factors that constitute sound constitutional analysis."'62 The
court instead adopted the criteria approach, as elaborated by Justice
Handler.Y
Still, certain state courts have endeavored consistently to employ

the primacy approach.( In State v. Ball, for example, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the question whether the
warrantless seizure of an object from an ashtray in the defendant's car
violated the New Hampshire and the United States Constitutions.
Mindful of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long,

the New Hampshire court declared that it would first consider the
state constitutional issue:
Since this court is the final authority on New Hampshire law,
initial resolution of State constitutional claims insures that the
party invoking the protections of the New Hampshire
Constitution will receive an expeditious and final resolution of
those claims. Therefore, we will first examine the New
Hampshire Constitution and only then, if we find no protected
rights thereunder, will we examine the Federal Constitution to
determine whether it provides greater protection.6
58. See Catherine Greene Burnett & Neil Colman McCabe, A Compass in the
Swamp: A Guide to Tactics in State ConstitutionalLaw Challenges,25 TEx. TECH L. Rnv.
75, 79-105 (1993) (cataloguing state constitutional arguments, including the following:
arguments from text, history, logic, academia, structure, policy, foreign courts, doctrine,
legislative and social facts, and practical arguments); Linde, First Things First,supra note
4, at 380, 392 (discussing forms of state constitutional argument).
59. See Morawetz, supra note 35, at 639.
60. The task of developing a truly independent state constitutional jurisprudence
demands "heroic efforts" on the part of state courts. See TARR, supranote 6, at 185.
61. See supranotes 43-50 and accompanying text.
62. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952,960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring).
63. See State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650-51 (NJ. 1983) (opinion of Handler, J.).
See also Williams, supra note 5, at 1022-23.
64. See Shaw, supra note 54, at 1026.
65. 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983).
66. Id. at 351.
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As a matter of constitutional interpretation, the court emphasized
that its citation to federal or other state court opinions in construing
the New Hampshire Constitution should not be construed as an intent
by the court to be bound by those decisions.67 True to its word, the
court analyzed the issue by addressing the text and historical
interpretation of New Hampshire's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and concluded there was no need to reach the
federal constitutional issue.'
D. A Choice of Method

None of these approaches to state constitutional interpretation
has escaped criticism. Some of the criticism is based upon sovereignty
concerns. Recall that in State v. Jackson, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Montana determined that the limit of the state constitutional
cognate of the Fifth Amendment should be defined by reference to
the U.S. Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.6 9 In
dissent, Justice John Sheehy challenged the lockstep approach and
accused the majority of allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to intrude
"upon the rights of the judiciary of this sovereign state." 70 Pursuing
the sovereignty issue, the justice continued: "the United States
Supreme Court has no business contravening the final decisions of a
state judiciary where no federal right guaranteed to all citizens has
been offended."'" In response to a similar ruling by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, one judge called upon his brethren "to reaffirm
that this Court and all appellate courts of this great State of Texas
constitute an independent appellate judiciary, and do not exist, when
it comes to interpreting the Constitution and laws of this State, solely
to mimic decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States."
Apart from the issue of state sovereignty, the interest in
uniformity that animates the lockstep approach has also received
criticism. Professor Tarr has questioned the claim that uniformity
67. See id. at 352.
68. See id. at 353-354.
69. Supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
70. State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255,260 (Mont. 1983) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 261.
72. Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J.,
dissenting). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has since ruled that, when analyzing
search and seizure questions under the state constitution, it "will not be bound by
Supreme Court decisions addressing the comparable Fourth Amendment issue." Heitman
v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). See also Burnett & McCabe, supra
note 58, at 105-06.
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would simplify the task of government officials. First, state officials
need to respect only one standard, the most rights-protective; in a
given case, this standard may derive from the state or the federal
constitution, but it remains, nonetheless, a single standard.73 Second,
the wholesale adoption of a federal standard does not necessarily
produce greater clarity in the law: given the U.S. Supreme Court's
struggle to articulate coherent principles in such areas as search and
seizure, there is no reason to believe in theory or expect in practice
that federal standards will be inherently easier to comprehend and
apply.74
Nor is the criteria approach immune from criticism. Robert
Williams has argued that the criteria approach is based upon a
mistaken notion - namely, "that interpretations of the Federal
Constitution can somehow authoritatively set the meaning for similar
An advocate of the primacy
provisions of state constitutions."'
approach, Professor Williams maintains that while the criteria
identified by Justice Handler in Hunt and the Washington Supreme
Court in Gunwal76 should serve "as important guides for scholars,
courts, and advocates" these criteria should not limit "state court
authority to disagree with Supreme Court constitutional analysis even
if none of the factors are present." At bottom, Williams objects to
blind adherence to U.S. Supreme Court reasoning by state courts
"merely because of the United States Supreme Court's institutional
position as the highest court in the land for the resolution of federal
constitutional claims."78
Indeed,
The primacy approach, too, has its critics.
notwithstanding the state court's independent authority in respect to
its own constitution, commentators and jurists contend that state
courts should defer to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations absent
some principled basis for distinguishing otherwise textually
indistinguishable constitutional provisions. James Gardner, for
example, has criticized courts that purport to employ a primacy
approach, like the New Hampshire Supreme Court, for failing to
develop their state constitutional decision-making through a
"discourse of distinctness" - that is, through "a language and set of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See TARR, supranote 6, at 181 n.32.
See id.
Williams, supranote 5, at 1046.
See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
Williams, supranote 5, at 1048.
Id. at 1054.
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conventions enabling participants in the legal system to argue that
provisions in the state constitution mean something different from
their federal counterparts."7' 9
The opinions of numerous state court judges reflect these
criticisms, particularly Gardner's view. New Hampshire Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Thayer, for instance, criticized his brethren for
failing to cleave to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the absence of a
distinctive ground upon which to conclude that broader protections
inhere in the New Hampshire Constitution:
Having the power to interpret some provisions as providing
greater protection.., does not mandate that we must interpret
our constitution more broadly, nor does it give us permission to
invent new constitutional protections that some may argue are
based on the whim of the majority.
....

Reactive rulings, utterly lacking in analysis or sound

historical basis, are not a sound manner of creating
constitutional jurisprudence.8s
Similarly, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Charles
Fried, questioning the commitment of the Massachusetts court to
establishing a jurisprudence of distinctness, suggested that his fellow
justices pause before interpreting identical textual provisions
differently, and ask themselves: "Is this decision wise, and - far more
to the point - is there something in our Constitution that authorizes
us to announce this anomalous rule and, by styling it a constitutional
judgment, to put it beyond the reach of the ordinary processes of
government?"'"
At a basic level, of course, criticism of each interpretive approach
is concerned, overtly and covertly, not simply with the legitimacy
concerns unique to the interpretation of cognate provisions, but with
the traditional counter-majoritarian concerns about judicial review
that such interpretation implicates' - particularly the potential for
independent state constitutional interpretation to confer broad rights
upon individuals at the expense of a state's democratic processes.'
79. Gardner, supranote 57, at 778.
80. Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1112 (Thayer, J., dissenting).
81. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 123 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J.,
dissenting). See also Commonwealth v. Guiney, 582 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1991) (Nolan,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for failing to articulate "any standard used to deviate
from the position of the Supreme Court").
82. See supra note 31 (discussing traditional counter-majoritarian concerns).
83. See, e.g., Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d at 123 (Fried, J., dissenting). See also People v.
Scott & People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1356 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority in search and seizure case for elevating "subjective expectations of
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With this potential in mind, lockstep advocates seek to prevent its
occurrence by urging state courts to decline to exercise their authority
to interpret the state constitution differently from the U.S.
Constitution, just as critics of the primacy approach, like Justice
Thayer, sound the alarm when state court judges appear to rule
differently because they dislike the U.S. Supreme Court's (typically

narrower) interpretations of federal law. At the same time, primacy
advocates continue to exult the power of state courts "to provide

broader standards, and go beyond the minimum floor which is
established by the federal Constitution. '
At another level, a deeper concern with independent state
constitutionalism emerges. This criticism focuses upon a perceived
fatal shortcoming of state constitutional interpretation pursuant to
the criteria and primacy approaches: that there is no real reason for a
state court, under either approach, not to respect a prior interpretive
position of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Gardner's view, for instance,
the development of an independent state constitutional "discourse"
may well be impossible, given the increasing lack of diversity of
citizens among the states.8' He argues that state courts should defer
to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of correlative provisions
because the state constitutions do not, in fact, represent the

fundamental values of a state's citizenry; rather, correlative provisions
appear to reflect shared national values, the meaning of which the
U.S. Supreme Court has authoritatively determined. 86 And so, in his
privacy to sovereign status by judicial fiat"); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029,
1040 (Mass. 1987) (Nolan, J., dissenting) (complaining about the majority's "liberal
interpretation" of state constitutional parallel to the Fourth Amendment); Paul S. Hudnut,
State Constitutionsand IndividualRights: The Case for JudicialRestraint, 63 DENVER U.
L. REV. 85, 98 (1985) (urging state court judges to exercise restraint because "[tihe line
between judicial functions and legislative functions is a thin one, and activist state courts
must avoid stepping into the legislature's shoes"). But see Tarr, supra note 6, at 174
(arguing that the "'counter-majoritarian difficulty' has been a less significant consideration
in state constitutional law [than in federal constitutional law]").
84. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991). See also Brennan,
supra note 1, at 491.
85. See Gardner, supra note 57, at 828-30 (arguing that the view that state
constitutions reflect the fundamental values of the state is "contradictory, counterfactual,
and potentially dangerous"). See also Kahn, supra note 19, at 1160 (describing the
perception of the state as a defined political community as "[nothing] more than an
anachronism or romantic myth").
86. See Gardner, supra note 57, at 823-32. Gardner writes: "The tension between
state and national constitutionalism has been largely resolved in the modem day United
States by the collapse of meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social
consensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and resolved on a
national level." Id. at 828.
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estimation, "it is simply implausible that [different state and federal]
constitutional doctrines can be attributed to differences in the
fundamental character and values of the people of the states. '" What
Gardner seems to suggest is this: notwithstanding that state courts
have the authority to interpret parallel provisions differently, that is
not reason enough, or justification enough, to do so when those
provisions simply "shadow" their federal counterparts.
And so the question remains: taken together, do these criticisms
suggest that state courts should adopt the lockstep approach as a
jurisprudential norm, or reserve deviation from that norm under the
criteria approach for those rare cases in which, say, a particularly
compelling historical reason militates in favor of independent review
of the state constitution? Answering this question requires that we
take a step back - back from the sovereign independence of the
states, back from the political implications of the new judicial
federalism that so clearly occupy the minds of many state court judges
and critics, and back from the state and federal bills of rights
themselves. We must revisit the structural provisions of the federal
constitution, and the implications of those provisions. For implicit in
the constitutional design of the federal system lies a respect for the
importance of dialogue that should inform the choice of interpretive
methodology in the state constitutional context. It is to that
constitutional value of dialogue that I now turn.
U. The Constitutional Value of Dialogue
Nearly a decade after his seminal Harvard Law Review essay,
Justice Brennan delivered the James Madison Lecture at New York
University School of Law. His subject was "The Bill of Rights and
the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights." 9 In his lecture, Justice Brennan recounted tales
of the incorporation battles, noting that the application of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily
involves determinations as to the content of the rights contained
87. Id. at 826. But see Shapiro, supra note 31, at 393 (arguing, contrary to Gardner,
that "[t]he state identity that is important for constitutional interpretation.., is
constituted not by the beliefs of the population of the state, but rather by the ideals
defined by the constitution itself").
88. See James A. Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories" Metaphor in State
Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. L. REv. 475, 488-89 (1996) [hereinafter States-asLaboratories];James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025,
1054 (1993).
89. Brennan, supra note 4.
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therein.' He lamented the "unmistakable trend in the Court to read
the guarantees of individual liberty restrictively,"'" and he reaffirmed
his conviction that states should, in his words, "step into the breach."'
Viewing the federal Bill of Rights as the "floor of protection,"
Brennan envisioned a "growing dialogue between the Supreme Court
and the state courts on the topic of fundamental rights. '
Justice Brennan did not elaborate on the nature of this "growing
dialogue," or offer evidentiary support for its existence. In this Part, I
seek to define dialogue as an expectation of our constitutional order
and as a necessary implication of federalism, a complement to the
complex system of checks and balances. An exploration of the
constitutional value of dialogue requires, first, some understanding of
the architecture of "dialogue." Next comes discussion of how the
structural relationships between and among the organs and branches
of the state and federal governments, as established by the U.S.
Constitution, reflect an appreciation for the beneficial effects of
dialogue.
A. The Architecture of Dialogue

As a foundational matter, we must define "dialogue" outside the
context of legal argument. "In certain quarters," John Durham
Peters has observed, "dialogue has attained something of a holy
status. It is held up as the summit of human encounter, the essence of
liberal education, and the medium of participatory democracy."' I
am interested here in examining the architecture of this most revered
form of communication, particularly its "regulating lines" - "the
guiding thoughts, the connections, the happy coincidences, that make
up its design."9' As the regulating lines of a building reflect the
geometry of its form, so, too, the structure of dialogue reflects its
value as a means, mode, and style of communication.
At its most basic level, the term "dialogue" refers to an exchange
of meaning across space. As Robert Grudin has explained in his
thoughtful essay on the subject, dialogue has three conditions:
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 546-47.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 550.

JOHN DuRHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF
COMMUNICATION 33 (1999).
95. JONATHAN HALE, THE OLD WAY OF SEEING 45 (1994). Hale notes that a
building's regulating lines "are usually, but not always, hidden...." Id.
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* two or more entities capable of discourse,
* a physical or mental space between these entities, separating
them, distinguishing them from each other, and
* a reciprocal exchange of meaning (logos) by these entities
across this space.9
In Grudin's view, the critical ingredients to dialogue are reciprocity
and strangeness. "Reciprocity" refers to an open-ended "give and
take" between two or more minds, while "strangeness" implicates
what Grudin calls "the shock of new information-divergent opinion,
unpredictable data, sudden emotions, etc. - on those to whom it is
expressed."'
To illustrate the architecture of dialogue, let us consider one of
Grudin's examples, Shakespeare's Hamlet - with apologies to both
Grudin and Shakespeare in adapting this example to the purposes of
this paper. Grudin reviews unrelated scenes from Hamlet to explicate
the nature of dialogue.' These passages include the scene in which
Hamlet, feigning madness, discusses theater with Polonius:
HAMLET. My lord, you played once i' the university, you say?
POLONIUS. That did I, my lord, and was accounted a good
actor.
HAMLET. What did you enact?
POLONIUS. I did enact Julius Caesar. I was killed i' the Capitol;
Brutus killed me.
HAMLET. It was a brute part of him to kill so capital a calf
there.99
Grudin includes a later scene, in which the Gravedigger (the First
Clown) attempts to explain a legal point to his companion: "For here
lies the point: if I drown myself wittingly, it argues an act; and an act
hath three branches: it is, to act, to do, and to perform .... .", As
Grudin explains, in these passages, "each character becomes part of a
large yet subtle dialogue, engaged in by most of the main characters,
11
on the subject of human action.""
Breaking these passages down using Grudin's taxonomy, in each
scene there occurs an exchange that satisfies the definition of
"dialogue." Each scene features two entities separated by mental and

96. ROBERT GRUDIN, ON DIALOGUE: AN ESSAY IN FREE THOUGHT 11 (1996).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 12.
See id. at 42.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3,sc. 2. (Cambridge ed. 1936).
Id., act 5, sc. 1.
Grudin, supra note 96, at 43 (footnote omitted).
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physical space exchanging meaning through language: Hamlet and
Polonius exchange different meanings on the nature of Polonius'
theater career, while the gravedigger counters his companion by
grasping toward a workable definition of "action." Each scene also
contains the requisite elements of strangeness and reciprocity: the
strangeness that causes Hamlet to reflect on the meaning, not of
Polonius' fictional death scene, but the actual death and perfidy that
has come to Elsinore - and to throw it back to Polonius by
commenting on his "brute part;" and the strangeness of the notion
that causes the gravedigger to reconsider his views on the meaning of
action and attempt again to define its meaning for his companion.
These smaller dialogues reflect a larger, interior dialogue about
the meaning of action that the author is having with himself, and also
a still larger dialogue, external to the play, that the author is having
with the audience or the reader on the same subject. As Grudin puts
it, Shakespeare's Hamlet embodies the author's fascination with the
idea of action in all its permutations: "he wants us to see it from all its
sides, pagan, Christian, psychological, sexual, ethical, political,
artistic ....Shakespeare's intention in this copious display is not to
simplify and conclude but rather to open up the subject in its living
complexity: to realize artistically its latent issues.""
To return to the subject of new judicial federalism: it would seem
that the purpose of dialogue, on Grudin's understanding, is at odds
with the judicial function. For the concern of the courts, in many
respects, is to simplify and conclude - to determine conclusively a
dispute of facts or a dispute of law between persons or entities who
share relationships external to the judicial process. This is too
superficial an analysis, however, because elemental dialogue also
appears in the relationships between and among the institutional
entities that may appear before the court, and dialogue, at another
level, serves an important functional end in respect to the judicial
process as well. Indeed, the dialogic process animates the regulating
lines of relationships established by the U.S. Constitution itself, as we
shall next see.
B. Dialogue and the Constitution

The United States Constitution is replete with dialogic
implications. Like Hamlet, for instance, the U.S. Constitution is a text
that speaks to its audience, albeit through a singular voice. That

102 Id. at 44.
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voice, as the writer E.L. Doctorow has observed, "is a quiet voice. It
does not rally us; it does not call on self-evident truths; it does not
arm itself with philosophy or political principle; it does not argue,
explain, condemn, excuse or justify.""0 3
Inspired by Sanford
Levinson," Doctorow likens the Constitution to a "sacred text of
secular humanism," and suggests that the reader interacts with the
text accordingly - with an understanding that the text challenges the
reader to appreciate political arrangements that are grand in design
and broad in scope, the details of which compel still further dialogue
among citizens on the meaning and continued relevance of those
arrangements. 5
This informal dialogue among citizens is also a tacit expectation
of the American constitutional order. Dialogue among citizens leads
to deliberative discourse in the proverbial public square, that "arena
in which our public moral and political battles are fought."' In this
way, informal dialogue among citizens lies at the foundation of the
democratic process, as such dialogue on public policy concerns,
influenced by the moral, pragmatic, and philosophical arguments of
citizens and citizen groups, ultimately leads to lawmaking - or not to
lawmaking, as the case may be. The Framers, contemplated that
deliberative discourse, through dialogue and discussion, would serve
as a necessary predicate to the operation of the machinery of
government."
That machinery is the primary subject of the Constitution of
1789. As discussed above, the starting point in debates about the new
judicial federalism has been the state and federal bills of rights, with
passing reference to notions of federalism. To appreciate the value of
dialogue in the American constitutional order, we must attend to
those provisions of the federal constitution that limn the machinery
and institutional relationships of government, bearing in mind that
the structure of the Constitution should serve as an important
"

103. E.L. Doctorow, A Citizen Reads the Constitution, in JACK LONDON,
HEMINGWAY AND THE CONSTITUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 1977-1992, at 125 (1993).
104. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
105. Doctorow, supra note 103, at 126.
106. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEvOTION 51 (1993).
107. See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 134-35 (1993) (discussing
principles of deliberative democracy). See also Lawrence Friedman & Neals-Erik William
Delker, Preserving the Republic: The Essence of Constitutionalism,76 B.U. L. REV. 1019,
1049 (1996) (book review) (arguing that the mediating effect of deliberatixe discourse
"ensures that fickleness and selfishness are not the bellwethers of American governance").
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touchstone in matters of constitutional interpretation.1
Notwithstanding their familiarity, it is worth reviewing some of
the essential constitutional provisions that establish horizontal
federalism in the form of a tripartite federal government, and that
illuminate the federal-state relationship. Following the Preamble,
Article I fixes the legislative power in the Congress, a bicameral
legislature composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives." Article I also addresses the specific powers of the
Congress,"' and details the procedure for enacting laws. That section
states, in part:
[1] All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
[2] Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States; if he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed
to reconsider it."'
Article II locates the executive power of the federal government
in the Office of the President," while Article III covers the judicial
branch, vesting the judicial power in "one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.".. In Article VI, the Constitution refines the horizontal
relationship between the federal government and the states,
mandating that, where federal and state law conflict, federal law shall
be supreme:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
108. See

CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
LAW 11 (1968) (advocating constitutional interpretation that sounds
"in the structure of the federal union, and in the relation of federal to state
governments"); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 752 (1999)
(discussing the use of structural argument in constitutional interpretation).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.").
110. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States .....
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1-2.
112. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").
113. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
CONSITUTIONAL
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shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Notably, this constitutional provision evinces an understanding that
state judges will be expected to take account of federal law.
The provisions of Articles I, II, and III establish specific
institutional relationships within the federal government and, with
Article VI, inform the relationship that flows from the horizontal
federalism that distinguishes the authoritative spheres of the state and
federal governments. Within these constitutional provisions, and
others, lies an expectation of dialogue more immediate than the
dialogic relationship between author and reader, and more definite
than the inherent deliberative expectations that animate American
democracy. Let us call this the formal expectation of dialogue, which
can be illustrated by examining some of the relationships established
by the Constitution in view of Grudin's definition of dialogue; these
examples demonstrate that dialogue is a necessary implication of the
structural relationships fixed by the Constitution and, therefore, a
constitutional value of some weight.
Consider, first, the procedures for enacting law at the federal
level. The Congress and the President are the institutional entities in
the lawmaking relationship - setting aside, for the moment, the
judiciary's role in reviewing the laws that result from the lawmaking
process. Deliberative discourse results in pressure to enact into law
some social policy - say, a law expanding the scope of the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement powers
under the Clean Water Act."5 Pursuant to Article I, this legislation
originates with a member of the House of Representatives and, after
committee action, is ultimately approved by a majority of the
membership of the House. It then moves to the Senate, where
changes are made that require the attention of a conference
committee to resolve the differences of the chambers. When the final
bill is deemed satisfactory by both Houses, it goes back to both
chambers for approval and is then presented to the President for his
signature. The President, believing that the additional regulatory
power the new law would give to the EPA is unnecessary, vetoes the

114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
115. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).
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bill and returns it to the House of Representatives.
This is a crude illustration of lawmaking,116 but sufficient for our
purposes to show that the procedures established by Article I
necessarily contemplate dialogue among federal institutional actors.
For the lawmaking process to function, discussion must occur about
the meaning of a text - in this case, the proposed law amending the
Clean Water Act. First, there must be dialogue among members of
the House in committee and the full chamber; second, there must be
dialogue between the House and members of the Senate; third, there
must be dialogue between the Senate and the House; fourth, there
must be dialogue between the Congress and the President; and,
finally, there must be dialogue between the President and the
House."7
At each level, then, we have at least two institutional actors
separated by a mental space (perhaps conservative versus liberal,
Republican versus Democrat), and an exchange of considered
opinion about the meaning of an evolving text, the proposed
legislation. At each level, the requisite elements of reciprocity are
also present - for example, the back and forth between Congress
and the President - as well as the "shock" of new information namely, the amendments and proposed revisions to the substance of
the new law as embodied by the texts at each successive and recurrent
level. The participants in the dialogue are, at each level, able to speak
to one another because they draw from a universe of shared terms in the case of lawmaking, those terms may reflect the languages and
grammar of social policy, economics, and political choice."'
Next, consider the dialogic expectations that follow from judicial
review. Returning to the lawmaking hypothetical sketched above,
suppose that Congress passes the proposed amendment to the Clean
Water Act, which the President then signs into law. The EPA,
following its mandate, in the course of time brings an enforcement
action against a large chemical manufacturing concern for allegedly
polluting "waters of the United States."'' 9 The EPA asserts that the
116. I base this description of hypothetical lawmaking upon James Q. Wilson's
excellent textbook summary. See JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
INSTrTUTONS & POLICIES 294-302 (3d ed. 1986).

117. And, of course, there will be sub-dialogues among individuals, constituencies, and
interest groups before, after, and during the formal dialogues contemplated by the
constitutional lawmaking process.
118. This is not to say, of course, that all the participants in the dialogue will appreciate
one another's contributions to the dialogue.
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1986) (defining "navigable water" for purposes of the Clean
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water in question, in this case a wetlands area removed from any
navigable stream or waterway, is within the contemplation of the
Clean Water Act. The manufacturing concern decides to challenge
the new law on Commerce Clause grounds, 20 and a U.S. District
Court sustains the challenge. The case eventually works its way to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which must address the constitutional
question: does Congress have the authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the wetlands in question?
At this point - admittedly, a relatively high level of abstraction
- a dialogue occurs between the political branches and the Supreme
Court on the meaning and application of constitutional text namely, the Commerce Clause - in a specific situation. The political
branches of the federal government initiated this dialogue by passing
the new law; the case at hand presented the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to respond, to join the dialogue.' The Court will review
the law and determine whether it complies with the Constitution; in
other words, the Court will reply to the political branches, one way or
the other, with its determination as to the meaning of the
constitutional text.
Thus, in the process of constitutional litigation there occurs
between these institutional actors an exchange of meaning across
physical and mental space and, therein, the reciprocity that qualifies
the exchange as dialogue. The necessary strangeness is also present,
in the assertion by the attorneys for the government that the
Constitution allows this instance of lawmaking; and in the Court's
reply, that it does or does not. If, in the Court's opinion, the
Constitution does not allow for such a law, the political branches may
react to this shock of new information and continue the dialogue by
proposing new legislation to avoid the constitutional difficulty, and so
on." As in the example of lawmaking, the parties to this dialogue Water Act).
120. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (allowing federal courts to hear only "cases" or
"controversies").
122. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (1962)
(observing that the court "often provokes consideration of the most intricate issues of
principle by the other branches, engaging them in dialogues and 'responsive readings');
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 655-59 (1993)
(discussing the "interactive," dialogic process of interpreting the Constitution). Just as
lawmaking will inspire new dialogues, so, too, new exchanges will spin from the Supreme
Court's opinion - between the government and the lower courts; between lower courts
and higher courts; between courts and commentators; between commentators and each
other; between professors and students; and so on, a bounty of forking thoughts and
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the government through its attorneys on one side, the justices on the
other - draw from a shared universe of terms to shape and frame
their contributions to the exchange - here, the language of
constitutional argument. ' 2'
Finally, consider the state-federal dialogue as an expectation of
Article VI. Suppose, to remain in the context of environmental
regulation, that a state and not the federal government passed a clean
water law, and that the state counterpart to the EPA sought to
enforce this law against a manufacturing concern by way of an action
in state superior court. And suppose the manufacturing concern
defended itself on the argument that the state law is at odds with the
Clean Water Act to the extent it would impede enforcement of the
latter and, therefore, should be deemed preempted under Article VI.
The case works its way through the state courts, which deny the
preemption challenge, to the U.S. Supreme Court, which must resolve
the Supremacy Clause issue. Thus, in the Supreme Court, a dialogue
about the meaning of constitutional text is joined between the state,
via its attorneys, and the justices of the Supreme Court - a dialogue
whose structure parallels that of the dialogue between the federal
government and the court in the case of judicial review of federal
legislation, and whose participants draw from the same universe of
shared terms in articulating their contributions to the dialogue.
In none of these examples should dialogue be regarded as a
constitutional mandate. Bills, after all, do not have to be submitted in
Congress - though if they are, the constitutional procedures must be
followed; and constitutional challenges to federal and state legislation
do not have to be brought - though if they are, a dialogue ensues.
And when in each instance a dialogue is joined between institutional
actors, such as Congress and the President, the Supreme Court and
the political branches of the federal government, or the Supreme
Court and a state, the dialogue serves important mediating functions:
to test the validity of federal or state governmental action, and so to
prevent the enforcement of invalid laws; to explore the ramifications
of federal or state governmental actions, and so to assess the integrity
of governmental actors; and, as a result of these inquiries, potentially
to influence debate about future actions of the federal and state
reflections. Cf.Jorge Luis Borges, The Garden of ForkingPaths,in JORGE LuIs BORGES,
COLLECTED FICTIONs at 119 (Andrew Hurley trans. 1998).
123. For discussion and examples of dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature
about the scope of constitutional mandates, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 247-51 (1988).
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governments.
So understood, dialogue between and among institutional federal
and state governmental actors about government is not so different
from dialogue between persons about affairs more personal than the
quiddities of democracy. As Grudin observed in regard to dialogue
between individuals, the dialogic requisites of reciprocity and
strangeness foster "an evolutionary process in which the parties are
changed as they proceed." 24 Like individuals, institutional actors may
be changed in their views as a result of dialogue, and react
accordingly: Congress or a state legislature might consider revising
proposed legislation, or seek an alternative route to achieving its
public ends; the Court might consider the new statute in resolving
another case before it, or deny its application, and in either case
create a precedent that has interpretive potential as a subject or term
of argument in yet another, incipient dialogue.
Viewed as a mediating influence, moreover, dialogue functions
as a corollary to the constitutional regime of checks and balances
between and among the branches and departments of the state and
federal governments. By virtue of its give and take structure,
dialogue, once joined, serves to curb institutional actions and
ambitions, for it naturally pushes participants in the dialogue - and
perhaps observers as well - to reconsider closely held positions. As
David Shapiro has remarked, dialogue emphasizes the need "for
continuing accommodation of competing, and in many instances,
equally compelling, considerations.""'
This understanding of dialogue - as an adjunct to federalist
principles - finds support in the views of the Framers. Alexander
Hamilton saw the system of inter-institutional checks, which
necessarily would require dialogue between and among the branches
of the federal government, as "means, and powerful means, by which
the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided."1" James Madison advised that,
[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
the government to controul the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary controul on the government; but experience

124. Grudin, supra note 96, at 12.
125. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 108 n.4 (1995).
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
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1
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.'
In light of Madison's warning, the necessity for dialogue as a
predicate to acts of lawmaking and governance may be viewed as an
auxiliary precaution, another mechanism by which institutional
ambitions are checked and government is itself controlled. It is in this
respect that dialogue both flows from and reinforces the regulating
lines of the Constitution's structural arrangements. And it is in this
respect that dialogue may similarly influence constitutional discourse
in the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the state
courts - the relationship to which we next turn.

IEL State-Federal Constitutional Discourse
Justice Brennan was mistaken in his James Madison lecture
about the potential limits of the dialogue he espoused, believing that
it would comprehend only "experimentation" above the federal
floor." In this Part, I seek to explain that the end of dialogue in the
state court-federal court relationship need not be the justification of
state experimentation above the constitutional floor, as Justice
Brennan urged. Rather, the constitutional value of dialogue supports
the notion of state constitutionalism as a legitimate interpretive
exercise that may potentially strengthen the fabric of
constitutionalism generally, by liberating the new judicial federalism
from provincialism - regardless of the outcome in a particular case.
In other words, state constitutionalism, when viewed through the
prism of dialogue, need not necessarily support expansive
interpretation of provisions protecting individual rights and liberties.
As an initial matter, we must appreciate the avenue by which state
courts may embrace the constitutional value of dialogue, and the
reasons why they should do so.
A. Invitation to Dialogue: Michigan v. Long
State supreme courts, of course, play a role similar to that of the
U.S. Supreme Court within the context of the state governmental
systems, exercising judicial review in appropriate cases to assess the
validity of state executive and legislative actions under the state
constitution. In those cases involving claims of individual rights and
liberties under parallel provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, the state courts also have an opportunity to engage in a

127. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison).
128. See Brennan, supra note 4.
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dialogue with the U.S. Supreme Court - an opportunity occasioned
by the U.S. Supreme Court's invitation in Michigan v. Long.'2"
Michigan v. Long concerned the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to review a Michigan Supreme Court judgment that a
Terry-type search of an automobile's passenger compartment was
unconstitutional. 3 ° The defendant claimed that the U.S. Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the Mvfichigan
court's judgment rested on an independent and adequate state
ground.' The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdictional reach is a function
of Article III, which, by the case-or-controversy requirement,
precludes the Court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions.""' Given this constitutional requirement, "if
the same judgment would be rendered by the state court" after the
U.S. Supreme Court "corrected its views of Federal laws, [Supreme
Court] review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion."''
To avoid this problem, and to resolve the issue for the future, the
Michigan v. Long Court determined that:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to
rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the
opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that
the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so. "
The Court then instructed state courts to indicate that a judgment
rests on an independent and adequate state ground:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as
it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need
only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion
that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached.135
As noted above, state courts have embraced the Michigan v. Long
129. 463 U.S. at 1032.

130. See id. at 1037.
131. See id. at 1037-38.
132. Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-9 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing ban on advisory opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court).
133. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,126 (1945).
134. 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
135. Id. at 1041.
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requirement to insulate their state constitutional decisions from
federal review. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example,
has stated that when it "cites federal or other State court opinions in
construing provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or
statutes," it relies "on those precedents merely for guidance and
do[es] not consider [its] results bound by those decisions." '36
Employing the definition of dialogue with which we have been
working, the Supreme Court's opinion in Michigan v. Long can be
viewed as the beginning of an indeterminate dialogue between the
U.S. Supreme Court and the state supreme courts. The U.S. Supreme
Court spoke in Michigan v. Long to the state courts, indicating its
view of the constitutional jurisdictional issues. The state courts
responded, and continue to respond, with statements like that of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court. There is thus a continuing exchange
of opinion between distinct entities about the meaning of text - in
this case, the Supreme Court's Article III jurisdiction and the scope of
the state court's jurisdiction in a given case. There is the requisite
reciprocity in the state court's response clarifying its interpretive
position. There is strangeness as well, as the state court must consider
the jurisdictional issue in each case in which it faces arguments by
counsel raising claims under both constitutions. And, if the case is
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court must confront this
new information in determining whether the state court adequately
addressed the jurisdictional issue.
The dialogic implications of Michigan v. Long relate to more
than just exchanges about this jurisdictional issue. Michigan v. Long
enables constitutional dialogue between the federal and state courts
in a larger sense. It invites state courts to participate in the
development of constitutional law by interpreting parallel state
constitutional provisions as they will, and not simply by paying blind
obeisance to interpretations put forward by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This invitation to dialogue supports the legitimacy of state
constitutionalism by emphasizing the state court's independent
authority to interpret its state constitution."
And it expressly
connects the state court's state constitutional interpretation to the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the cognate provision of the
federal constitution, by creating an opportunity, at an interpretational
136. State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983). See also Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) (making a "plain statement" of the adequate and
independent state grounds).
137. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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decision point, for the state court to engage in discourse with its
federal counterpart about the meaning of shared constitutional text
discourse about such aspects of law and governance as the
meaning of liberty, equality, and due process, and "the structures of
representative government necessary to achieve these values."'
Such discourse offers a means by which the U.S. Supreme Court's
actions may be assessed, evaluated, and balanced.
This higher-level discourse also fits our definition of dialogue,
albeit a dialogue conceived as occurring over greater mental - and
temporal - distances. To illustrate, consider Commonwealth v.
3 9 a 1988 case in which the Massachusetts
LaFrance,'
Supreme Judicial
Court reviewed the constitutionality of special conditions of
probation which required that the probationer "submit to a search of
herself, her possessions, any place where she may be, with or without
a search warrant, on request of a probation officer."'" ° The defendant
challenged these conditions under both the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and part I, article 14 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. 4 The Supreme Judicial Court indicated that it
would resolve the case under the state constitution,4 2 and began its
discussion with a U.S. Supreme Court case, Griffin v. Wisconsin,4' in
which the court had upheld a probation regulation that authorized
warrantless searches of probationers if "reasonable grounds" existed
to believe contraband was present."
In LaFrance,the Supreme Judicial Court accepted, for purposes
of article 14, that a reduced level of suspicion could justify a search of
a probationer and her premises: "[tihere is a need to supervise such
an offender both to aid in the probationer's rehabilitation and to
ensure her compliance with the conditions of probation." 45 But,
unlike its federal counterpart, the Massachusetts court did not obviate
the warrant requirement; persuaded that a warrantless search could
not be justified under article 14, the Supreme Judicial Court expressly
rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning that the warrant

138. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1148.
139. 525 N.E.2d 379,380 (Mass. 1988).
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 380, 383.
143. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
144. Id. at 876-77 (concluding that "the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system
make the warrant requirement impracticable").
145. 525 N.E.2d at 381.
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requirement would unduly interfere with the execution of the
The court, citing Justice Shirley
probation officer's charge.
Abrahamson's dissent from the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision
in Griffin, stated:
[T]he issuance of a search warrant on a proper showing of
reasonable cause "is not an undue burden on the probation
officer and provides the protection for the probationer
guaranteed by the constitutions [State and Federal]. Requiring
an officer to articulate reasons for the search is a deterrent to
impulsive or arbitrary governmental conduct - and that is what
the fourth amendment is about."' '
The Massachusetts court concluded that article 14 "bars the
imposition, 147 on probationers of a blanket threat of warrantless
searches.
The shape of this dialogue follows the familiar pattern. It begins
with the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Griffin; by virtue of
Michigan v. Long, Griffin becomes a starting point for a discussion of
the extent of constitutional privacy protections of probationers under
the Fourth Amendment - the starting point, in other words, for an
exchange of meaning about the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Presented with an opportunity to respond in LaFrance,the Supreme
Judicial Court indicates, pursuant to Michigan v. Long, that it will
consider the issue as a matter of state law, and the court then analyzes
the correlative provision of the Massachusetts state constitution,
which contains language virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment
in all respects relevant to the probation search issue."4
The exchange has the necessary reciprocity, as the Supreme
Judicial Court engages the U.S. Supreme Court on its own terms.
The exchange also displays the requisite element of strangeness on
each side - strangeness from the Supreme Judicial Court's
perspective, in the initial interpretation in Griffin with which it had to
contend, and from the perspective of the federal Court, in the
Massachusetts court's differing view as to the meaning and
requirements of the same text. The exchange encourages the
evolutionary development of constitutional interpretation on the part
of each of the participants, to a greater extent in the state court. But
146. Id. at 382-83 (quoting State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 545 (Wis. 1986)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 383.
148. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 14 (providing, in part, that "[e]very subject has a right
to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his
papers, and all his possessions").
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this need not be the case: no jurisprudential rule requires the U.S.
Supreme Court to ignore state court interpretations of cognate
provisions as respectable authority, and the Supreme Court has on
occasion relied upon state constitutional decisions for guidance in
characterizing federal constitutional obligations.'49 As a theoretical
matter, then, the U.S. Supreme Court could continue the GriffinLaFrancedialogue in the next case involving probation searches.
B. Why Dialogue?

Unlike the expectation of dialogue that attends the relationships
of federal lawmaking and judicial review of federal and state
legislation, Griffin-LaFrance-likeexchange is entirely at the option of
the state court. There is no expectation of dialogue per se, because
the state court is under no obligation to accept the invitation in
Michigan v. Long. As a practical matter, state courts may be inclined
to respond to Michigan v. Long to clarify that they are resolving an
issue under the state constitution in order to further the development
of state constitutional law for its own sake, consistent with the state
supreme court's obligations as the final arbiter of state law. This is
a justification for the new judicial federalism that underlies much of
the advocacy in its favor.
But, as suggested above, there is another reason why state courts
should choose to accept the Michigan v. Long invitation and join a
dialogue about constitutional text: to fulfill the foundational premise
of the constitutional expectation of dialogue as it exists in the context
of horizontal federalism - that is, to engage institutional actors in the
process of continually expanding and deepening discussion about the
meaning of the Constitution and, in particular, its provisions
governing civil rights and liberties, thereby potentially checking
unmediated institutional action. ' As the Griffin-LaFrancedialogue
149. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (relying
upon New Hampshire Supreme Court analysis of state constitutional takings provision in
J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1981), to differentiate between
permissible regulation and unconstitutional taking under the federal constitution). See
also EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAw 58 (1994) (discussing state
precursors to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1996)); Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in
Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal
Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 28 n.12 (1993) (discussing instances in
which the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the lead of state courts in expanding the scope
of federal constitutional guarantees).
150. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 26, at 495 (discussing state supreme court judge's
obligation to say what state constitution means).
151. See McGreal, supra note 13, at 1144 (discussing system of checks and balances
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illustrates, state courts can contribute to state and federal
constitutional discourse by providing an interpretive counterpoint to
' In the spirit of enabling government to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 52
control itself, and of promoting a broader understanding of
constitutional rights and responsibilities, state court interpretations of
cognate provisions can be beneficially appreciated, analyzed, and
contrasted with federal precedent by federal and state court judges,
legislators, executive branch personnel, and so on, all to the end of
inspiring new informal and formal dialogues about the nature of
constitutional mandates and obligations, and the effects of those
mandates and obligations in such policy-driven areas as law
enforcement.'53
To be sure, dialogue is not the only value that may guide the
discretion of the state court in determining whether to embrace the
new judicial federalism, either as a general policy in cases involving
cognate provisions or for the purposes of a specific case. Prudential
interests in predictability and stability may also influence such
determinations. By "predictability and stability," I refer to the value
that inheres in constitutional decisionmaking that follows from the
reasoned elaboration of principles and concepts articulated in prior
cases and is within the comprehension of practitioners and citizens."5
An interest in predictability and stability may manifest itself in a
preference for uniformity in the interpretation of cognate
constitutional provisions, particularly in respect to provisions
against faction and ambition in context of horizontal federalism).
152. Cf. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977) (discussing the importance of the
"dialectical federalism" that may emerge when the U.S. Supreme Court's silence or broad
pronouncements allow an opportunity for federal-state dialogue, as in the habeas corpus
context).
153. See, e.g., John T. Broderick, Jr., Constitutional Criminal Procedure and the New
Federalism: Whose Law Applies?, Address Before the FBI Academy (Sept. 10, 1999)
(transcript available with author) (suggesting that federal law enforcement personnel
should be aware of state constitutional criminal procedure); cf. Rende M. Landers,
Federalizationof State Law: Enhancing Opportunitiesfor Three-Branch and Federal-State
Cooperation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 811, 822-24 (1995) (discussing strengths of system of
shared responsibilities between federal and state governments in respect to law

enforcement).
154. See HARRY H.

WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 110 (1990) (reasoning that

"[s]tability, in its many different aspects, is... especially important: individuals and
institutions use prior decisional law in their efforts to organize the future"). See also
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
723, 748-49 (1988) (discussing importance of stability and continuity in constitutional
adjudication).
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governing law enforcement; such a preference results in state and
federal rules controlling the conduct of government officials that are
identical in scope and breadth.'
Such uniformity has a chimerical quality, based as it is upon the
assumption that U.S. Supreme Court doctrine provides some
reasonable measure of predictability and stability in a particular area
of constitutional law. As Professor Tarr has explained, "given the
Supreme Court's well documented difficulties in such fields as
religious liberty and search-and-seizure," there may be little reason to
expect either predictability or stability to flow from its decisions."
That state and federal law may provide different constitutional
standards in regard to cognate provisions should not be cause for
great alarm, moreover, as there already is significant variation in laws
among the fifty states and the federal government.
More importantly, a preference for uniformity effectively denies
a state court's sovereign obligation to say what its state constitution
means. " Recall once again State v. Jackson,""in which the Supreme
Court of Montana declined to undertake any independent state
constitutional analysis, preferring instead to defer, in the interest of
uniformity, to the U.S. Supreme Court's prudential concerns about
the privilege against self-incrimination. 59 Such deference for the sake
of uniformity is fundamentally inconsistent with the nation's
commitment to dual constitutionalism, pursuant to which state courts
have a duty to interpret their constitutions that they cannot
legitimately delegate to the Supreme Court "by binding themselves to
its rulings.' ' "W
The most profound effect of a preference for uniformity over
dialogic considerations in state constitutional decisionmaking would
be to further sanctify the interpretational influence of the U.S.
Supreme Court vis-A-vis its institutional position as the final arbiter of
the meaning of the constitutional provisions relating to individual
155. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
156. TARR, supra note 6, at 181 n.32. As a practical matter, the consistent independent
interpretation of cognate constitutional provisions should result in the development of
state decisional law that is no less predictable or stable than its federal counterpart. Of
course, it may be no more predictable and stable, either.
157. See HENNESSEY, supra note 149, at 61 (when uniformity is preferred, the question
arises "whether the state court is in default of its duty to construe the state law
independently").
158. 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
159. See id. at 258.
160. TARR, supra note 6, at 181.
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fights and civil liberties. The Supreme Court addessed that position

in the 1958 case Cooper v. Aaron,'61 stating that Marbury v. Madison
"declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution." 62 The Court
reasserted this principle in the 1962 case Baker v. Carr:'66
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed
by the Constitution to another branch of government, or
whether action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has
been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.'

More recently, in the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores,'6 the Court
overturned the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and emphasized
its "primary authority" to interpret the federal constitution."
Such broad assertions by the U.S. Supreme Court do not prove
true in every instance;' 67 the Supreme Court's so-called "final

authority" is, in many ways, case-specific."

Accordingly, a vibrant

161. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
162. Id. at 18.
163. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. Id. at 211.
165. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
166. Id. at 524; See also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2333 (2000)
(noting that "Congress may not legislatively supersede [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution").
167. Indeed, Cooper v. Aaron has been criticized as "an overstatement, politically
necessary in its context but indefensible as a general claim of judicial interpretive
authority." Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359,1362 (1997).
168. See Kahn, supra note 19, at 1163-64 (remarking that "[o]nly occasionally does a
court speak authoritatively to a constitutional controversy"). I should clarify here that in
cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved an issue under the U.S. Constitution,
its determination is entitled to deference as a matter of federal constitutional law. The
constitutional value of dialogue informs the processes that lead to binding legal
determinations by institutional actors; it does not authorize such determinations. Thus,
while the expectation of dialogue validates sustained discourse about the U.S. Supreme
Court's textual interpretation in a particular case, it does not support the view of Edwin
Meese that a competing nonjudicial constitutional interpretation should be entitled to
equivalent authoritative weight. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61
TUL. L. REv. 979,983-86 (1987). In other words, when the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled,
the dialogic principle does not justify the failure of the other branches and organs of
government to defer to its case-specific determination as final arbiter of the U.S.
Constitution. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 167, at 1387 (under the institutional
design of the federal constitution, decisionmakers must "defer to the judgments of others
with which they disagree"). Dialogue is an expectation and a value that serves to
encourage discourse about democratic governance, not a structural provision that defines
or creates institutional authority in specific cases.
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federal court-state court dialogue can work to counter somewhat the
U.S. Supreme Court's dominating influence on constitutional
discourse. The process of "judicial exegesis" of the U.S. Constitution,
as Justice Frankfurter put it," is in a real sense ongoing:
Judicial decisions rest undisturbed only to the extent that
Congress, the President, and the general public find the
decisions convincing, reasonable, and acceptable. Otherwise,
the debate on constitutional principles will continue.
What is "final" at one stage of our political development may
be reopened at some later date, leading to fresh interpretation
and overrulings of past judicial doctrines.17 °
The federal court-state court dialogue thus can inform the "debate on
constitutional principles," serving as a resource for those who seek
alternative interpretive possibilities.
As Justice Jackson famously remarked, the U.S. Supreme Court
is not final because it is infallible, but infallible only because it is
final. 7' To the extent state courts decline the invitation in Michigan v.
Long to join a dialogue with the U.S. Supreme Court and, thereby, to
contribute to the larger debate on the meaning of constitutional
principles, the Supreme Court's presumed "infallibility" may not be
seriously challenged - and constitutional discourse will be poorer as
a result.
C. Dialogue and the Primacy Approach
Assuming a state court accepts the Michigan v. Long invitation,
still the question with which we ended Part I persists, albeit in a
somewhat refined form: which interpretive approach - lockstep,
criteria, or primacy - should the state court employ so as to best
realize the benefits of constitutional dialogue? Aside from the
advocacy of Justice Brennan, both in judicial opinions and in law
review articles, the U.S. Supreme Court has not opined on the quality
169. Graves v. New York ex ret O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,491 (1939).
170. FISHER, supra note 123, at 244-45. See also Alexander & Schauer, supra note 167,
at 1387 (the finality of U.S. Supreme Court decisions "does not mean that a critique
against a standard external to the decision is impossible," for "even final Supreme Court
decisions can be subject to criticism from the perspective of whatever the observer
believes the proper standards for constitutional decisionmaking to be").
171. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). As one
commentator has noted, Justice Jackson intended by this comment to criticize "the cult of
the robe," but "an observation presented as institutionally self effacing has come to

describe the contemporary character of the institution."
THE COURT 230 (1987).

JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF
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of state constitutional interpretation. By this, I mean that the Court
has not suggested - and there is no reason why it should - that state
constitutional interpretation should track a particular interpretive
model.'
If a state court accepts the invitation in Michigan v. Long to join
in a federal court-state court dialogue, true participation in that
dialogue can be accomplished only when the state court adopts the
primacy approach as its interpretive methodology. For to follow the
lockstep approach would be, in effect, to decline the Michigan v.
Long invitation. And to follow the criteria approach would be to
miss the dialogic mark: reliance upon unique state sources as the
means of deviation from the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation,
assuming the existence of such sources, would fail to accomplish the
goals of the constitutional dialogue, because such sources have no
relevance to the interpretation of the federal constitution. Under the
criteria approach, in other words, the state court would be talking to
the Supreme Court about the same text, but not in a way that the
latter could appreciate, for the participants in the exchange would not
be working from the same lexical sources. Only when the federal and
state courts discuss the same text, working from a shared universe of
terms, does a true dialogue ensue.
And only the primacy approach allows the federal and state
courts to rely upon the same universe of considerations. As discussed
above, the primacy approach supposes that the state court will treat
its constitution as constitutional, in the sense that the court will
employ the full gamut of "constitutional arguments" in determining
By "constitutional
the reach of the document's requirements.'
arguments," I refer to the "kinds of argument that now are almost
universally accepted as legitimate in constitutional debate and
These modes of
interpretation" of the federal constitution. 4
text,
constitutional
and
about
from
include
arguments
argument
structure, original intent, history, prudence, precedent, and policy."5
Using these arguments, the state court can speak to the U.S. Supreme
172. But see Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(noting that "when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal
Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have to power to
amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement").
173. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
174. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,100 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1987).
175. See id. at 1194-1209. See also PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY
OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1982) (discussing modalities of constitutional argument).
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Court on its own terms, and any ensuing debate on the meaning of
shared constitutional text can resonate across borders.
A reliance upon the primacy approach returns us to the concern
of jurists and commentators who question the grounds for state courts
to "ratchet up" individual protections under the state constitution.
On this view, if a constitutional text has already been authoritatively
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court should decline
to look at this text anew. The fear lies in the possibility that state
court judges will simply seize upon the availability of the state
constitution merely to further "liberal" - that is, rights-protective interpretations of the text.17 6 It also reflects a belief that the federal
constitution establishes the minimum standards for rights protection
and, therefore, "up" is the only direction rights protection can go
under the new judicial federalism. "
The problem with the argument is that it assumes there can be
only one legitimate interpretation of a particular constitutional text.
But, as Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson has
observed, "the broad phrases of a bill of rights" exemplify the
"difficulties of interpreting language."' 178
These interpretive
difficulties are susceptible to a number of means of clarification and
explanation using the accepted modes of constitutional argument.
Because interpreting language is difficult, the legitimacy of a
particular interpretation depends not upon which appellate court,
federal or state, is doing the interpreting, but upon the extent to
which the interpretation at issue is sound and plausible. And a
particular interpretation of constitutional text typically will be
considered sound and plausible when it is based upon an accepted
mode of constitutional argument, correctly applied in the case at
hand.
176. See supranotes 80-81 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., States-as-Laboratories,supra note 88, at 488. As noted above, Justice
Brennan assumed this to be the case as well. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 550 (discussing
the Bill of Rights as the "floor of protection").
178. Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 732. Consider the reflections of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo on the subject of the "broad phrases":
No one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Here is a concept
of the greatest generality. Yet it is put before the courts en bloc. Liberty is not
defined. Its limits are not mapped and charted. How shall they be known? Does
liberty mean the same thing for successive generations? May restraints that were
arbitrary yesterday be useful and rational and therefore lawful today? May
restraints that are arbitrary today become useful and rational and therefore
lawful tomorrow? I have no doubt that the answer to these questions must be
yes.
BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROcEss 76-77 (1921).
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Using the accepted modes of constitutional argument described
above, multiple sound and plausible interpretations of the same text
are possible. The modern U.S. Supreme Court regularly releases
fractured opinions in which the justices each offer an explanation of a
result upon which they all agree, but which each justice has reached
by a different mode of argument. In United States v. Lopez,179 for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied primarily upon structural,
textual, and precedential arguments to support the Court's
determination that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded
In a
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."
from
upon
arguments
relied
Thomas
concurring opinion, Justice
original intent and history to reach the same conclusionY"
Interpretations that do not rely upon accepted modes of
constitutional argument are of course possible, but these
interpretations will be regarded as unsound or implausible to the
extent they cannot otherwise be justified under one or another of the
accepted arguments. One could frame an argument that the First
Amendment's speech protections should be interpreted to extend to
all expression, including defamation, obscenity, and fighting words,
because the First Amendment comes first in the Bill of Rights, but
this argument would be based upon numerical ordering, which is not,
by the measure of logic, history, or custom, an accepted mode of
constitutional argument. Though such an interpretation is possible,
the First Amendment absolutist pressing this position would have to
locate an alternative justification in an accepted mode of
constitutional argument lest the "numerical ordering interpretation"
be deemed unsound or implausible and, therefore, illegitimate.
Thus, constitutional interpretations may fall, as a general matter,
into one of two broad categories: possible and sound/plausible, or
possible and unsound/implausible."' The U.S. Supreme Court holds
no monopoly on determinations in the former category; there is
nothing about the Court's institutional position that immunizes it

179. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
180. See id. at 552-58.
181. Id. at 590-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
182. Naturally, there may be arguments that result in interpretations that are not
possible and, therefore, are necessarily unsound and implausible. Within the category of
"possible and sound/plausible" arguments, moreover, there often will exist plausible
interpretations that are more persuasive than others. See Fallon, supra note 174, at 124446 (suggesting that there is a hierarchy of constitutional argument, with arguments from
the text and based upon historical intent at the top).
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from the hazards of interpretive difficulties.1" To the extent it relies
upon an accepted mode of constitutional argument, correctly applied,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is
certainly legitimate in the federal and state realms, but it can be
regarded as finally authoritative only in the former." There is no
reason, on the level of pure interpretation, for the state court to
consider the U.S. Supreme Court's determinations as anything more
than decisional guidance: the state court may rightly view the federal
determination as reliable, but only to the extent that the federal court
employed an accepted mode or modes of constitutional argument in
reaching its determination, and then only to the extent that the
federal court correctly applied that particular mode of constitutional
argument in the circumstances of the case."
There is, in addition, a practical response to the concern that the
primacy approach will be employed by state courts simply to "ratchet
up" individual rights protections. While the Supremacy Clause would
block the enforcement of state constitutional provisions that provide
less protection than their federal counterparts, state courts are still
free to interpret state constitutional cognates as providing less
protection, or as ultimately providing the same protection, as
provided under the federal constitution, albeit for different reasonsY"

183. See Williams, supranote 9, at 388. As noted above, this is not to say that the U.S.
Supreme Court's case-specific determinations are not entitled to deference as binding
interpretations of the federal constitution. See supra note 158. It is to say that the U.S.
Supreme Court is not always right simply because it is final.
184. And there are numerous interpretations by the U.S. Supreme Court that state
court judges and commentators view as unsound or implausible, a fact the state court may
consider in determining how much weight to accord a particular decision - and a point the
state court may make in the constitutional dialogue. See, e.g., State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d
277, 288-93 (Iowa 2000) (discussing scholarly and judicial criticism of the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 904 (Pa. 1991) (same). As Paul Kahn has observed, court
decisions are simply another text subject to interpretive analysis. See Kahn, supra note 19,
at 1164.
185. Cf.Kahn, supra note 19, at 1168 (observing that Michigan v. Long -effectively
frees a state court to build its interpretation upon the best sources of argument, wherever
it might find them").
186. See Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial
Review: 1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CINN. L.
REV. 317, 336 (1986) (discussing arguments by Oregon Attorney General in briefs before
state supreme court urging court not to adopt Miranda precedent under state law); Barry
Latzer, FourHalf-Truths About State ConstitutionalLaw, 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 1123, 1127
(1992) (explaining that "nothing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts from
interpreting state law more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are barred [by
the Supremacy Clause] from enforcing the less-protective state law").

Fall 2000]

Fall 20001

CONSTIUTONAL VALUE OF DIALOGUE
CONS1'ITUTIONAL VALUE OF DIALOGUE

This means that final state court interpretation of the state's cognates
to the "broad phrases of... bills of rights," reached through modes of
constitutional argument different than those employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, or the same mode of argument applied differently,
need not necessarily be more liberal than the federal interpretations
of the parallel provision; it need not even be at odds with the federal
decision."
In the end, even Professor Gardner's criticism of independent
state constitutionalism and the primacy approach loses much of its
force when viewed through the prism of constitutional dialogue.
Recall Gardner's skepticism about the depth of state
constitutionalism as a reflection of state, as opposed to national,
values, and his contention that this lack of depth militates against
independent interpretation.' Because the value of dialogue reflects
a federal constitutional concern, its vindication vis- -vis state
constitutionalism does not necessarily depend upon "differences in
the fundamental character and values of the people of the states.""
In other words, assuming Gardner is correct that state constitutions
may reflect variations of a national identity, a state court still would
not be disabled or precluded from contributing to the larger project
of interpreting shared constitutional text, for the dialogic approach
(to paraphrase Jennifer Friesen) encourages state courts to make
good constitutional law, using accepted constitutional argument; it
does not mandate that state courts make unique constitutional law."9
IV. The Constitutional Expectation of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism: Search and Seizure Discourse
Having located support for the practice of new judicial
federalism in the constitutional value of dialogue, and explained why
state courts should utilize the primacy approach when interpreting
cognate provisions, I will turn in this part to an illustration of state
court-federal court dialogue. Commonwealth v. LaFrance,discussed
above, offers a glimpse of such a dialogue.19' In this Part, I examine
the New Hampshire Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Canelo.'9 I
187. Latzer, supranote 186, at 1128-30.
188. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.

189. Gardner, supra note 57, at 826.
190. Friesen, supra note 16, at 1071 (contending that "a state court's duty is not to
make unique constitutional law, but to make good constitutional law").
191. Supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
192. 653 A.2d at 1097.
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choose this opinion because it comes from a state supreme court
committed to the project of the new judicial federalism and the
primacy approach. It accordingly offers a particularly relevant
example of a state court's acceptance of the invitation to dialogue,
and the promise that such a dialogue may hold.
A. The Decision
Canelo concerns the question whether the trial court erred in
suppressing evidence seized when the police acted in good faith in
obtaining and executing a search issued in violation of New
Hampshire's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment.10
That
provision - part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution states:
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and
all his possessions. Therefore, all warrants to search suspected
places.., are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if
the order.., to make search in suspected places... or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of
the persons or objects of search.., or seizure; and no warrant
ought to be issued; but in cases, and with the formalities,
prescribed by law.194
In the circumstances of the case, a magistrate had issued an
anticipatory search warrant which could be executed only upon a
police informant's observation of contraband at a given time and
location. 9s The trial court later concluded that such an anticipatory
warrant was invalid, and the supreme court affirmed that ruling
"because the detached magistrate inappropriately delegated [her]
constitutional function to the prosecuting authority... in violation of
part I, article 19.,,196

The State argued that the court should adopt a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution. The
court began its analysis under the state constitution by tracing the
193. Id. at 1099. Canelo also concerned the validity of anticipatory search warrants
under the state constitution. See id. Subsequent to briefing and oral argument before the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, the defendant died, and the State filed a motion
requesting that the court proceed with the appeal; determining that the case presented
"significant constitutional issues of public interest and are likely to occur again," the court
agreed. Id. (quotation omitted).
194. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19.
195. See Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1100.
196. Id. at 1102 (quotation omitted).
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evolution of the exclusionary rule in New Hampshire. The court
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted the federal
exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, in 1914.17 The Weeks
Court established the rule "as a necessary corollary to the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, concluding that fourth
amendment guarantees would be meaningless unless courts
'1
prohibited the government from using unlawfully seized evidence." 8
New Hampshire declined to adopt such a rule, and in the seminal
1961 case Mapp v. Ohio,'99 the U.S. Supreme Court required the state
courts to apply the federal exclusionary rule in state prosecutions
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Canelo court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had, since
Mapp, retreated from its original justification for the exclusionary
rule, stating in United States v. Calandr °' that "the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the
search victim ....Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The U.S. Supreme Court further modified the exclusionary rule in
United States v. Leon,2 in which the Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained
pursuant to an invalid warrant, so long as the police acted in good
faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate.2 In Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
sole purpose of the federal exclusionary rule is to deter police
misconduct.' 5
Because Mapp required application of the federal exclusionary
rule whenever a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, "there was
little reason to employ a State exclusionary rule."2 ' Nonetheless, the
New Hampshire court continued, "since at least 1983," it had

197. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

198. Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1103.
199. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

200. See id. at 658-59 (concluding that the exclusionary rule was necessary to provide a
remedy to those individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated).
201. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
202. Id. at 347-48.
203. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
204. See id. at 913.
205. See id. at 916.
206. Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1104.
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recognized the existence of a state exclusionary rule; during this time,
moreover, the court had "repeatedly emphasized the importance of
undertaking independent interpretation of... State constitutional
guarantees. ' '2° In a series of cases beginning in 1983, the court tacitly
acknowledged that a state exclusionary rule prohibited the state from
using at trial any evidence obtained in violation of part I, article 19.'
After reviewing its precedents on the issue, the Canelo court
moved on to consider the history of the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Like the Fourth
Amendment, the origins of part I, article 19 can be traced to the
equivalent provision of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."
That provision was intended "to abolish general warrants and writs of
assistance which had been used by the British to conduct sweeping
searches based upon generalized suspicions and without specifying
the places to be searches or things to be seized."21'
The New
Hampshire court also reviewed the policies animating its search and
seizure jurisprudence. The court recognized that part I, article 19
"safeguards privacy and protection from government intrusion, 211
and "manifests a preference for privacy over the level of law
enforcement efficiency which could be achieved if police were
permitted to 212 search without probable cause or judicial
authorization."
In view of the text of part I, article 19, its history, the precedents
establishing the exclusionary rule, and the policies underlying the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
as well as the development of the federal exclusionary rule, the
Canelo court concluded that the exclusionary rule is "a logical and
necessary corollary to achieve the purposes for which prohibitions
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
were

207. Id. (citing, interalia, State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983)).
208. See, e.g., State v. Chaisson, 486 A.2d 297, 304 (N.H. 1983) (holding that when
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable seizure has been violated, "evidence
obtained in violation of this right cannot be used at trial").
209. New Hampshire adopted part I, article 19 in 1784, copying part I, article 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which had been adopted in 1780. "As a source of
the Fourth Amendment, the Massachusetts provision on search and seizure was the most
important of all the state models, because it was the one the Fourth Amendment most
resembles." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 170 (1999).
210. Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1104.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1104-05.
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constitutionalized. ' '2u The court specifically disagreed with the U.S.
Supreme Court's determination in Leon that the deterrence of police
misconduct is the sole aim of the exclusionary rule:
The exclusionary rule serves to redress the injury to the privacy
of the search victim and guard compliance with the probable
cause requirement of part I, article 19. Enforcement of the rule
places the parties in the position they would have been in had
there been... no violation of the defendant's constitutional
right to be free of searches [and seizures] made pursuant to
warrants issued without probable cause. In so doing, the rule
also preserves the integrity of the judiciary and the warrant
issuing process."
The court accordingly held that a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule would be "incompatible with and detrimental to our
citizens' strong right of privacy inherent in part I, article 19 and the
prohibition
against the issuance of warrants without probable
215
cause."
B. State v. Canelo as Dialogic Artifact
The exchange on the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule began with the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Leon. In Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the
exclusionary rule, as a creature of judicial crafting, rather than a
mandate of the Fourth Amendment itself, is concerned exclusively
with deterrence of future misconduct; accordingly, when that purpose
cannot be served - for example, when police officers rely upon a
search they in good faith believe to be valid - the rule should not
apply. Through the Michigan v. Long invitation, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court responded in State v. Canelo to the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning, concluding that the exclusionary rule is a "logical
and necessary" corollary to part I, article 19 - the New Hampshire
cognate of the Fourth Amendment - which necessarily precludes the
adoption of a good faith exception.
This exchange has all the elements necessary to qualify as a
constitutional dialogue. The exchange features two distinct entities
separated by mental and temporal space. The first entity, the U.S.
Supreme Court, transmits information to the second, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, which has the shock of the new: in a case
in which a magistrate has issued a defective warrant, the U.S.
213. Id. at 1105.
214. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
215. Id.
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Supreme Court rules that the federal exclusionary rule does not
require that evidence obtained in a good faith belief in the warrant's
validity be suppressed. In making this determination, the U.S.
Supreme Court employs the traditional modes of constitutional
argument: attention to text, history, precedent and the underlying
policy considerations at issue in the circumstances of the case.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in a case involving a
constitutional provision in all important respects identical to the
Fourth Amendment, responds to its federal counterpart's opinion in
Leon. For its part, the New Hampshire Supreme Court draws from
the same universe of terms to explain its different, and equally
plausible, conclusion - that is, that the exclusionary rule is not
devoted exclusively to the deterrence of future police misconduct but,
rather, has a constitutional basis as a means of effectuating the
personal privacy protections secured by part I, article 19. The New
Hampshire court uses text, history, precedent and policy concerns to
support its determination. The case so decided, the court releases its
opinion and this strange information is communicated to, among
other governmental actors and individuals, the present and future
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court was neither the first nor the
last state court to visit the issue of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 16 Each court that visits the issue, regardless of its
ultimate determination, engages the U.S. Supreme Court in a similar
dialogue. These dialogues are observed by other state courts, as well
as by commentators and other governmental actors, and become part
of still other dialogues; indeed, the Canelo court specifically noted
that it found support for its view in the decisions of other state courts
that have held "that the good faith exception is inconsistent with the
state constitutional requirements of probable cause." '
As the dialogue between the New Hampshire and U.S. Supreme
Courts inspires other dialogues, so the evolutionary development of
the issues explored therein continues. While the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's analysis of the good faith issue may not have been
particularly rigorous, it is an example of a state court fulfilling the
expectation of dialogue using the primacy approach. Having other
216. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 289 (Iowa 2000) (discussing cases in which
state courts have rejected Leon and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule);
Leigh A. Morrissey, Note, State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A
Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND.L. REv. 917,934-37 (1994).
217. Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1105.
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judges, equally competent in the task of constitutional interpretation,
bring their skills to bear on shared constitutional text serves the end
of enhancing constitutionalism, by providing an authoritative
counterpoint to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the
constitutional rights of citizens and the correlative restrictions upon
government. In other words, the new judicial federalism serves to
enliven what Paul Kahn calls "the debate over the meaning of the
2 1 as state courts join dialogues
rule of law within a democratic polity,""
with the U.S. Supreme Court, and with each other, as part of a
continuing discourse about a common enterprise: the unfolding
development of American constitutionalism.
It scarcely needs mention at this point that, had the New
Hampshire Supreme Court deferred to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Canelo by using the lockstep approach, or based its decision upon
some unique state source without application in the context of the
federal constitution, no true dialogue between the courts would have
been joined. Under the criteria approach, the U.S. Supreme Court
and the New Hampshire Supreme Court simply would have been
talking at each other in Leon and Canelo, thus diminishing the
significance of the exchange to other courts and to other dialogues
about the scope of the exclusionary rule and, more generally, about
the meaning of the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Conclusion
The expectation of dialogue in the context of horizontal
federalism supposes dialogue as a constitutional value that
complements the federalist regime of checks and balances. In the
context of the new judicial federalism, the value of dialogue promotes
federalist principles by validating the initiative of state supreme
courts to speak to the U.S. Supreme Court about interpretations of
shared constitutional text - that is, to engage the U.S. Supreme
Court in discourse about the meaning of parallel provisions state and
federal constitutions and, thereby, to balance the Court's perceived
interpretational supremacy.
The promise of such dialogue is realized when state courts use
the primacy approach to interpret cognate provisions of the state
constitution, turning first to the state constitution when a litigant
raises claims under both constitutions and relying upon federal

218. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1168.

144

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28:93

decisions only for guidance in interpreting the cognate provision. In
so doing, state courts speak to the U.S. Supreme Court on its own
terms, with reference to a common universe of constitutional
argument. Such engagement allows state courts to provide an
antidote to the U.S. Supreme Court, and to make a meaningful
contribution to a larger, national discourse about individual rights,
governmental obligations, and the rule of law - matters of no small
moment in our constitutional democracy.

